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IN DEFENSE OF PROMETHEUS:  
SOME ETHICAL, ECONOMIC, AND 
REGULATORY ISSUES OF SPORTS DOPING 
RICHARD A. POSNER† 
A chapter in The Case Against Perfection: Ethics in the Age of 
Genetic Engineering,1 a book by Michael Sandel, the well-known 
Harvard political philosopher, provides a convenient stepping-off 
place for an analysis of the social issues involved in sports doping. 
The chapter is entitled “Bionic Athletes,” and despite the reference 
in the subtitle of the book to genetic engineering the chapter is mainly 
about doping rather than about genetic alteration; the author returns 
to the topic of doping in a later chapter, “Mastery and Gift.”2 By 
“sports doping” I mean, of course, the use of performance-enhancing 
drugs by athletes, though professional athletes will soon resort to 
genetic alteration as well or instead, because it will be harder to 
detect.3 There are other methods of athletic performance 
enhancement as well. Some of them, such as taking up temporary 
residence at a very high altitude in order to increase one’s red blood 
corpuscles,4 tremble on the edge between tolerated and reprobated 
methods of improving one’s athletic performance. I will focus on 
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Agency, Montreal, Can.), Issue 1 – 2005, at 1, 1 (noting possibility of “genetically-altered” 
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 4. See SANDEL, supra note 1, at 32–33 (describing the problem of distinguishing between 
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drugs, but glance from time to time at alternative methods of 
enhancing athletic performance. 
Sandel’s book mentions cosmetic surgery only in passing,5 though 
he discusses at greater length the analytically similar phenomenon of 
administering human growth hormone to a child of average height in 
the hope of making him an adult of above-average height.6 The social 
issues (regulatory, economic, ethical) that cosmetic surgery raises are 
interestingly alike and unlike those raised by sports doping, so I shall 
refer in places to cosmetic surgery as well and even to coaching 
children to help them get into desirable schools—still another 
practice that has parallels to sports doping.7 
As one could have anticipated from his previous writings,8 Sandel 
opposes the use of drugs to enhance athletic performance. He thinks 
such use detracts from the athlete’s achievement; what seems the 
athlete’s achievement is actually the achievement of the drug’s 
inventor.9 Even worse, in Sandel’s view, the use of drugs to enhance 
athletic performance represents “a Promethean aspiration to remake 
nature, including human nature, to serve our purposes and satisfy our 
desires.”10 It is not, however, the “drive to mastery” per se that 
troubles him but the effect of that drive in obliterating what he calls 
“the gifted character of human powers and achievements”—the 
recognition that “not everything in the world is open to any use we 
may desire or devise.”11 
Now it is far from obvious what value this “giftedness” has or 
why “Promethean aspiration” should be denigrated. Prometheus is 
the Titan of Greek mythology who gave fire to man at great personal 
cost;12 from the human standpoint he is a hero. In reality, of course, 
man domesticated fire; but was that accomplishment “Promethean” 
 
 5. Id. at 8–9. 
 6. Id. at 16–19. 
 7. See infra pp. 1734–35. 
 8. For Sandel’s previous writings on his political philosophy, see generally MICHAEL J. 
SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 
(1996); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY: ESSAYS ON MORALITY IN POLITICS (2005); 
Michael J. Sandel, The Baby Bazaar, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 20, 1997, at 25. 
 9. See SANDEL, supra note 1, at 25. 
 10. Id. at 26–27. 
 11. Id. at 27. 
 12. See HESIOD, Works and Days, in THEOGONY AND WORKS AND DAYS 37, 38–39 (M.L. 
West trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1999). 
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in a pejorative sense? And why should “Promethean” have such a 
sense? I defer these questions to later in this Essay.13 
The importance that Sandel attaches to “giftedness” as he 
defines the word leads him to distinguish between two sources of 
athletic achievement: the “effort and striving, grit and determination” 
of Pete Rose, and the “grace and effortlessness [of players like Joe 
DiMaggio] whose excellence consists in the grace and effortlessness 
with which they display their natural gifts.”14 Sandel insists that 
because “the point of sports” is “excellence,” and “excellence consists 
at least partly in the display of natural talents and gifts that are no 
doing of the athlete who possesses them,” doping is bad less because 
it enhances “effort” than because it challenges the “natural” 
hierarchy of the “natural talents.”15 It challenges giftedness in the 
sense in which we say that a child has a musical “gift,” meaning 
something innate rather than achieved, just as an ordinary gift is 
something you receive rather than make. A gift is for Sandel more 
“natural” than effort.16 
The distinction is forced; in the case of DiMaggio versus Rose, it 
is muddled. Both baseball players had outstanding athletic skills. 
Both had grit and determination. DiMaggio was more graceful and 
gave the impression of “effortlessness,” but he is admired primarily 
for his achievements rather than for his style.17 And “grit and 
determination” are, it seems to me, as innate as “natural talents”—
they are no less natural—though Sandel may believe in free will in a 
strong sense and therefore regard grit and determination not as 
innate attributes but as products of the exercise of a faculty that sets 
human beings apart from other animals.18 
Distinguishing Pete Rose from Joe DiMaggio is not the only line-
drawing problem that Sandel faces in picking out the enhancements 
 
 13. See infra pp. 1739–40. 
 14. SANDEL, supra note 1, at 27. 
 15. Id. at 28–29. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Stephen Jay Gould, The Streak of Streaks, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Aug. 18, 1988, at 8, 8, 
available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/4337 (“Nothing ever happened in baseball above 
and beyond the frequency predicted by coin-tossing models. The longest runs of wins or losses 
are as long as they should be, and occur about as often as they ought to. . . . There is one major 
exception, and absolutely only one—one sequence so many standard deviations above the 
expected distribution that it should not have occurred at all: Joe DiMaggio’s fifty-six-game 
hitting streak in 1941.”). 
 18. See SANDEL, supra note 1, at 27 (discussing “grit and determination”). 
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of athletic performance that should be forbidden. Suppose an 
otherwise naturally gifted baseball player has below-average eyesight. 
Should he be permitted to wear glasses? Or to have surgery to correct 
nearsightedness? How about surgery that would give him 20/10 vision 
rather than 20/20? Should he be permitted to take vitamins? Protein 
supplements? To use a weight-lifting machine to build strength? If he 
is a boxer, should he be permitted to wear a helmet and required to 
wear boxing gloves? Should an athlete be permitted to drink coffee 
before an athletic event? If so, should he be permitted to substitute 
caffeine pills? Caffeine is a chemical found in unimproved nature; but 
so for that matter are anabolic steroids, such as testosterone. Athletes 
at the ancient Olympic Games tried to enhance their performance by 
ingesting “bulls’ testicles and stimulating herbal potions.”19 Was their 
behavior natural or unnatural? 
Sandel’s solution to the line-drawing problem is to base the scope 
of permissible enhancements of athletic performance on identifying 
the “essence” of the game,20 or equivalently “the nature of the sport,” 
which in his view determines “whether the new technology highlights 
or obscures the talents and skills that distinguish the best players.”21 
But in a discussion of technological interventions in athletic 
capabilities, or indeed in human capabilities generally, the word 
“nature” is richly and relevantly ambiguous. We have just seen 
Sandel use the word in two senses: “nature” as something innate in a 
biological being22 and “nature” as the core or object of a human 
practice.23 The distinction is between that which is definitional or 
characteristic of a particular entity or activity (the Aristotelian 
concept, the second sense above)—and thus one might speak of the 
“nature” of a human artifact, such as a game—and that which exists in 
the natural (prehuman or nonhuman) world rather than being a 
human artifact (the first sense). Shakespeare played on this duality in 
King Lear: the bastard Edmund is natural in the second sense, 
unnatural in the first.24 The meanings quickly get confounded when 
one is talking about sports doping because the objections to it are 
 
 19. Yorck Olaf Schumacher & Michael Ashenden, Doping with Artificial Oxygen Carriers, 
34 SPORTS MED. 141, 142 (2004). 
 20. SANDEL, supra note 1, at 36. 
 21. Id. at 37. 
 22. Id. at 38. 
 23. Id. at 37–38. 
 24. See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING LEAR act 1, sc. 2. 
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bound up with a sense that drugs themselves are not “natural” 
(though all are composed ultimately of natural materials, as is 
everything physical) and on that ground alone are likely to be more 
objectionable to Sandelians than, say, exercise. 
But I think Sandel is on to something in relating the objections to 
sports doping to the “nature” of sports both in the Aristotelian sense 
(the “natural” as what is fit or proper to some particular activity or 
creature) and in the biological sense. The relation lies in the innate 
human delight—archaic as it may seem in our age rich in egalitarian 
pretense—in innate human hierarchies, such as hierarchies of height, 
strength (though it is innate only to a degree, being a function in part 
of the activities in which a person engages, even if he is not 
deliberately body building), agility, physical coordination, beauty, 
brilliance, and musical talent (and the delight in animal hierarchies 
too, as in horse racing). The origins of this innate delight are, 
plausibly, evolutionary. To primitive man—man in the “ancestral 
environment,” as evolutionary biologists call the circumstances to 
which human beings became adapted in their long prehistory—
differences in innate abilities relating to hunting and fighting were 
salient, closely observed, and highly correlated with survival prospects 
for the group as well as for the individual. Admiration of and 
deference toward the superior performers were not only natural in a 
Darwinian sense but compellingly sensible from a social perspective. 
These attitudes inform human beings’ love of sports, which isolate 
and exhibit innate hierarchies, most of which are closely related to the 
hierarchies that fascinated primitive man—hierarchies of the traits 
that promote success in hunting and fighting. 
Sports are designed to highlight, isolate, and display one or more 
of these hierarchies and to invite our admiration for the athletes who 
occupy the highest rungs. They are “a test of biological potential.”25 
So the question of doping and other technological interventions 
comes down to whether the particular intervention disrupts or 
obscures the hierarchy. Often it does neither, as Sandel, who is not 
entirely opposed to progress, recognizes.26 He gives the example of 
better running shoes. They benefit all runners more or less equally, in 
 
 25. But see J. Savulescu, B. Foddy, & M. Clayton, Why We Should Allow Performance 
Enhancing Drugs in Sport, 38 BRIT. J. SPORTS MED. 666, 667 (2004). As the title of this article 
makes clear, this is not the only possible view to take of the aim of sports; and if it is rejected, 
the case against sports doping is gravely weakened, as the authors explain. 
 26. SANDEL, supra note 1, at 37. 
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part by reducing the risk of injuries that could happen to even the 
best runners, and so they do not disrupt or obscure innate differences 
in fleetness of foot. At the opposite extreme (this is not one of 
Sandel’s examples, but it illustrates his approach) would be a drug 
that increased running speeds at a diminishing rate, so that the slower 
you naturally were the more the drug would add to your speed; 
eventually everyone would run at the same speed, and footraces 
would disappear. The speed of these technologically enhanced 
runners might dazzle, but the pleasure that the audience took in it 
would be that of “spectacle” rather than that of sport.27 It would be 
like watching robots run. 
In between would be allowing a person with a bad leg to use a 
golf cart in a professional golf tournament, where golf carts normally 
are forbidden.28 Stamina is not what a golf tournament seeks to test, 
so compensating for an abnormal deficiency in stamina does not (it 
seems to me—Sandel is noncommittal)29 disturb the relevant 
hierarchy, as it would in long-distance swimming. Allowing the use of 
the golf cart is more like the elimination of the color bar in 
professional baseball: it improves the contest by eliminating an 
arbitrary bar to participation (arbitrary in relation to the nature of the 
game—it would not be arbitrary to refuse to cast a black woman in 
Othello as Desdemona). The running shoes may be a parallel 
example. And likewise allowing baseball players to correct below-
normal vision. But they should not be allowed to enhance normal 
vision, because superior vision is one of the ingredients of the innate 
skill that the baseball contest ranks; it is one of the keys to a high 
batting average. 
Critics of doping bans point out that often there are nondoping 
substitutes for drugs, such as weight lifting for steroids. But there is a 
difference, though it is obscured by Sandel’s attempt to distinguish 
“natural” skills from “grit and determination.”30 Except, as I have 
suggested, for people who believe in free will in a strong sense, grit 
and determination are as innate as having good physical coordination 
and are among the attributes that affect an athlete’s place in most 
 
 27. This is a distinction Sandel emphasizes. Id. at 43–44. 
 28. This was the subject of a Supreme Court decision, PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 
661, 691 (2001), in which the Court required the PGA Tour to allow a disabled golfer to use a 
golf cart, which Sandel discusses, SANDEL, supra note 1, at 42–43. 
 29. See SANDEL, supra note 1, at 42–43. 
 30. Id. at 27. 
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sports hierarchies. Weight lifting requires grit, patience, and 
determination; popping a pill does not. Actually, the contrast is 
overdrawn, because the usual (and safer—possibly quite safe) use of 
steroids by athletes is intermittent,31 with body building used to 
maintain the strength created by the steroids. But there is less effort 
relative to the degree of improvement when steroids are used rather 
than the athlete’s relying on unaided body building, and the 
difference is relevant to assessing whether using steroids disrupts or 
obscures the relevant hierarchy in a sport like football or baseball. 
Even so, one might want to make a distinction along the 
following lines. Runners in the ancient Olympic Games did not have 
good running shoes, so presumably they injured themselves more 
than modern runners do. But because having fewer injuries does not 
equate to running faster, the modern runner does not have an 
unearned advantage over his predecessors. Steroids, in contrast it 
may seem, enable a football player whose natural gifts are no greater 
than those of his predecessor in the pre-steroid era to outperform that 
predecessor, precluding skill rankings across time. But this distinction 
overlooks the many uncontroversial technological and institutional 
improvements that have boosted modern athletic performance over 
that of earlier eras: better nutrition, better health care, better 
methods of training, better surface composition of running tracks, 
and, yes, better running shoes. The only robust distinction between 
good and bad performance enhancers is between those that disturb or 
obscure, and those that leave unaltered, the hierarchies of “natural” 
talent that sports seek to exhibit. It is not realistic to maintain a “level 
playing field” over time so that the performance of modern athletes 
can be compared with that of their predecessors millennia or 
centuries or, in some sports, even decades ago—think of what a 
difference the modern composite metal tennis rackets make to tennis 
playing. Even if it were feasible to ban technological innovations from 
 
 31. Andrew B. Parkinson & Nick A. Evans, Anabolic Androgenic Steroids: A Survey of 500 
Users, 38 MED. & SCI. SPORTS & EXERCISE 644, 648 (2006) (reporting that 90 percent of 
steroids users surveyed administered anabolic androgenic steroids in cycles of four to twelve 
weeks with drug-free intervals in between these cycles); Miia Pärssinen & Timo Seppälä, Steroid 
Use and Long-Term Health Risks in Former Athletes, 32 SPORTS MED. 83, 84–85 (2002) 
(explaining that athletes generally use steroids in cycles of six to twelve weeks); Chris Street, 
Jose Antonio & David Cudlipp, Androgen Use by Athletes: A Reevaluation of the Health Risks, 
21 CANADIAN J. APPLIED PHYSIOLOGY 421, 434–36 (1996) (noting that most athletes use 
steroids intermittently and that moderate use produces only minor and reversible side effects). 
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sport, it would not be desirable in cases in which the innovations 
improved performance from the standpoint of the fans. 
Nor are technological improvements that are distinct from 
performance-enhancing drugs the only factors, other than those drugs 
and institutional changes such as better training of athletes, that have 
boosted enhanced athletic performance over time. The economist J. 
C. Bradbury points out that racial integration and immigration, along 
with natural population growth, have increased the pool of potential 
baseball talent, while at the same time team expansion has increased 
variance in players’ abilities, so good hitters face some poor pitchers, 
and good pitchers some poor hitters.32 
Still, Sandel has shown, to my satisfaction anyway, which modes 
of athletic performance enhancement harm a sport and which do 
not.33 I would have argued the point somewhat differently, but I have 
no basic disagreement with it. 
But toward the end of the chapter he goes seriously astray. He 
worries that 
[i]f people really believed that the rules of their favorite sport were 
arbitrary rather than designed to call forth and celebrate certain 
talents and virtues worth admiring, they would find it difficult to 
care about the outcome of the game. Sports would fade into 
spectacle, a source of amusement rather than a subject of 
appreciation. Safety considerations aside, there would be no reason 
to restrict performance-enhancing drugs and genetic alterations—no 
reason, at least, tied to the integrity of the game rather than the size 
of the crowd.34 
He is right, as should be clear from my earlier discussion, that the 
rules of sports are not “arbitrary.”35 And he is right to set safety 
considerations to one side.36 They do not warrant restricting sports 
doping (or genetic alterations). The use of steroids in 
“supratherapeutic” doses to enhance athletic performance does have 
adverse effects both physical and psychological,37 but they might be 
 
 32. J.C. Bradbury, What Really Ruined Baseball, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2007, at A27. 
 33. See SANDEL, supra note 1, at 36–44. 
 34. Id. at 43 (footnote omitted). 
 35. Id; see also supra text accompanying note 28. 
 36. Id. at 11. 
 37. See, e.g., Fred Hartgens & Harm Kuipers, Effects of Androgenic-Anabolic Steroids in 
Athletes, 34 SPORTS MED. 513, 534–43 (2004); J.J. Patil et al., Case Report, Near-Fatal 
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slight if their use were not forbidden.38 The methods of doping that 
minimize the likelihood of detection, such as oral ingestion of 
anabolic steroids, tend to be the more dangerous methods.39 The 
preference for that method of consumption is thus an artifact of 
prohibition. And as in any black-market situation (such as the black 
market in narcotics), the absence of warranties, of instructions for 
proper use, and of monitoring by medical personnel impairs quality 
control and as a result increases the danger to the user.40 In any event, 
the adverse health effects of anabolic steroids seem to dissipate within 
a short time after cessation of use,41 though the absence of long-term 
effects cannot be confirmed because there have been no rigorous 
studies of those effects.42 
Sandel’s second and more serious muddle is his attempt to 
oppose “amusement” to “appreciation” and “size of the crowd” to 
“integrity.”43 The size of the crowd (nowadays mostly a television 
audience) that a sport attracts is inseparable from the success of the 
sport in exhibiting the hierarchy of “talents and virtues” that the 
audience admires.44 That exhibition is the key to a sport’s popular 
success, or, in other words, to the size of the crowd that it attracts. 
 
Spontaneous Hepatic Rupture Associated with Anabolic Androgenic Steroid Use, 41 BRIT. J. 
SPORTS MED. 462, 462 (2007). 
 38. Richard D. Collins, Anabolic Steroid Legislation: The Wrong Prescription?, 9 CRIM. 
JUST. J. 98, 103 (2001) (“[I]t is time for our laws to discard the view of anabolic steroids as 
‘deadly drugs’ for mature adults, based on the medical and scientific truth. The current scheme, 
with its unsupervised self-administration of potentially dangerous black market 
pharmaceuticals . . . is the wrong prescription indeed.”); see also Street et al., supra note 31, at 
436 (arguing that controlled administration of moderate doses of steroids “could induce positive 
changes . . . with little to no side effects”). 
 39. George Fan, Comment, Anabolic Steroid and Human Growth Hormone Abuse: 
Creating an Effective and Equitable Ergogenic Drug Policy, 1994 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 439, 442 
(citing Herbert A. Haupt, Anabolic Steroids and Growth Hormone, 21 AM. J. SPORTS MED. 468, 
469 (1993)). 
 40. Hartgens & Kuipers, supra note 37, at 518. Drs. Parkinson and Evans report that 89 
percent of the users of anabolic androgenic steroids obtain the drugs illegally. Parkinson & 
Evans, supra note 31, at 649. 
 41. Hartgens & Kuipers, supra note 37, at 527 (“After drug withdrawal the alterations of 
body composition fade away slowly, but may be partially present for time periods up to 3 
months. However, on the basis of scientific data, the final net result of short-term [androgenic-
anabolic steroids] administration on body composition seems to be rather small.” (footnotes 
omitted)). 
 42. Id. at 517. 
 43. SANDEL, supra note 1, at 43. 
 44. There are sports in which this not true, or less true, like professional wrestling and auto 
racing. 
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What this means—and it is critical to the formulation of sensible 
public policy toward performance-enhancing drugs—is that the 
“problem” of sports doping has only a minor public dimension; its 
solution can largely be left to the free market. It is largely a 
nonproblem—though, as we will see, not entirely so. 
If what the public wants from sports performances is to observe 
hierarchies of innate qualities, then it is in the financial self-interest of 
the owners of professional sports teams, and for that matter the 
owners of amateur sports teams (such as universities), to prevent drug 
taking or other interventions that alter or obscure the relevant 
hierarchies. They might try to prevent even some interventions that 
do not alter or disturb any of those hierarchies. The reason is again 
financial self-interest. If because the public believes that steroid use 
alters these hierarchies (even if it does not—even if it increases every 
player’s performance proportionately) it associates sports doping with 
the consumption of cocaine and heroin, thinks cheating inherent in 
the use of performance-enhancing drugs though in fact it is inherent 
merely in the imperfect enforcement of the prohibition against the 
use of such drugs, or worries that permitting professional athletes to 
use them will have bad effects on children (for whom professional 
athletes are role models), again the team owners might ban these 
drugs, and these too would be decisions without any great public 
significance. This point, the unimportance of what team owners 
would decide to do if left to their own devices, is obscured by Sandel’s 
use of the term “talents and virtues” to describe what it is that sports 
exhibit,45 as if watching a sport were edifying—as if one were admiring 
a display of virtue and, by admiring it, becoming more virtuous 
oneself. 
The self-correcting character of sports doping flags a paradoxical 
difference between it and cosmetic surgery. Physical attractiveness 
(including height) is very largely relative.46 One person is more 
attractive than another person, and this confers personal and 
professional advantages, but if the other person caught up by means 
of cosmetic surgery, there might be no net benefit for the pair. One 
would be better off than before—the one who had had the cosmetic 
surgery—but the other would be worse off, because he would have 
lost the advantage that being more attractive than his competitor 
 
 45. SANDEL, supra note 1, at 43 (emphasis added). 
 46. See infra pp. 1738–39. 
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conferred. If pitchers and hitters in baseball both become better, the 
game may be better in the sense of attracting a larger audience, and if 
so the players have not engaged in a pure arms race in improving 
their performance. And if their competition ever reaches the point at 
which it spoils the game, the owners (perhaps with the aid of 
government, as I discuss below) will take measures to stop it. 
Cosmetic surgery, even for normal persons as distinct from 
disfigured and other abnormal persons, is probably not entirely an 
arms-race phenomenon. Probably the gain in self-esteem to the 
people who have the surgery exceeds the loss of advantage to the 
naturally attractive, if only because cosmetic surgery, unlike sports 
doping, usually does not do a great deal for a normal person’s looks; 
the naturally attractive retain a comfortable margin of attractiveness, 
though this may change as cosmetic surgery gives way to genetic 
interventions. But the most interesting difference between sports 
doping and cosmetic surgery is not the different intensity of their 
arms races but the fact that the demand for cosmetic surgery lacks an 
adequate self-correcting mechanism. Think of people who take 
human growth hormone to become taller. If everyone were a foot 
taller than he is at present, there would be no net social gain. In fact 
there would be a considerable loss, because it would cost more to 
feed, clothe, and house everyone, without the additional cost 
conferring any benefit. The competition in height would top out at 
some point for biological reasons, but whatever average increase in 
height had been attained before that happened would be all cost and 
no benefit. 
Or consider the practice in New York City of hiring coaches to 
prepare one’s four-year-old for an interview for admission to a fancy 
kindergarten.47 The coaching contributes nothing to the child’s 
development but merely puts pressure on other parents to hire 
coaches for their kids; there is again no net social benefit. Sports 
doping is different, to the extent it improves a sport in the eyes of the 
spectators. 
But whether sports doping creates net social benefits may depend 
on the costs of controlling it. Not all sports doping improves a sport; 
perhaps very little does; and perhaps the cost of an outright ban 
would be less than trying to achieve the optimum positive level of 
 
 47. See Jane Gross, Right School for a 4-Year-Old? Find an Adviser, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 
2003, at A1. 
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sports doping. The problem of control is that the use of performance-
enhancing drugs can be very difficult to detect,48 especially when they 
are used in preseason training. Performance-enhancing genetic 
alterations are even more difficult to detect.49 And although team 
owners have a collective interest in maintaining the integrity of the 
innate talent hierarchy that the sport in which their teams engage is 
designed to exhibit, individual owners have an incentive to defect 
from rules designed to maintain that hierarchy. The owner who can 
dope his athletes without the other owners’ discovering what he is 
doing can steal a march on them. 
The combination of difficulty of detection with incentives to 
defect may make purely private sanctions for violating a doping ban 
an inadequate deterrent. Criminal or other public penalties may be 
necessary. To illustrate, let B be the benefit from violating a rule, P 
(smaller than 1) the probability that the violation will be detected and 
punished, and S the sanction for the violation; then PS is the expected 
cost of the sanction to the violator, and it must exceed B (PS > B) to 
deter the violation. Equivalently, deterrence requires that S > B/P. 
Thus the smaller P is (because of the difficulty of detection) and the 
larger B is (because of the gain to the team owner from successful 
cheating), the less likely the inequality is to be satisfied, and the 
sanction will fail to deter. If the benefit from the violation is $1,000 
and the sanction $10,000, still the violator will not be deterred if the 
probability of detection (and hence of the imposition of the sanction) 
is less than 10 percent, because $10,000 ×.1 does not exceed $1,000. 
(Equivalently, $10,000 does not exceed $1,000 ÷ 0.1.) 
So deterrence may require a heavy sanction—heavier than a 
private entity can impose. The private sanction for violating a doping 
ban is not trivial—the player who is caught can be expelled from the 
team or even from the league—but it may not be large enough 
 
 48. See, e.g., Rajendrani Mukhopadhyay, Catching the Bad Sports: Don Catlin Has Made a 
Career of Developing Techniques That Strike Out Athletes Who Use Illicit Performance-
Enhancing Drugs, 79 ANALYTIC CHEMISTRY 3963, 3965 (2007) (characterizing performance-
enhancing drugs as “sophisticated” and arguing that testing methods must match the heightened 
level of sophistication); Bob Nightengale, Is HGH Hiding Steroid Use?, USA TODAY, Sept. 12, 
2007, at 1C (reporting that the use of human growth hormone helps athletes conceal the use of 
steroids). 
 49. See, e.g., Maria Cheng, Scientists Racing to Catch Gene-Dopers, USA TODAY, Dec. 15, 
2006, available at http://www.usatoday.com/tech/science/2006-12-15-gene-dopers_x.htm. This 
may, however, be changing. See id.; Sal Ruibal, A New Tool to Catch Sports Cheats: Test for 
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relative to the difficulty of detection to be an adequate deterrent. For 
if he is a good player, the team (and the league) will be reluctant to 
expel him and may be content instead with imposing a fine, 
suspension, or other sanction that may not satisfy the deterrence 
formula. The team owner who was complicit in sports doping might 
be expelled from the league, but he could sell the team and thus 
escape a large financial penalty. Both player and owner, if detected, 
face a significant blow to their reputations as well as financial 
sanctions that may be modest; but if the gains from doping are great 
enough and the likelihood of detection small enough, it may be 
rational to dope. Detection, reputational and other likely sanctions, 
risk aversion, benefits from cheating, and perhaps other factors 
affecting deterrence are likely to vary across players, so there are 
likely to be some violations of any antidoping rule, and perhaps, for 
the reasons I have suggested, widespread violations. In particular, 
weaker players are quite likely to violate the rule. They will benefit 
more from doing so than the best players and also be less likely to be 
detected, both because they do not stand out the way the best players 
do and because their drug-enhanced performance may seem like 
“normal” improvement. 
In situations in which private remedies are insufficient to deter 
inefficient behavior, private firms seek the aid of government, for 
example by asking it to annex criminal penalties to the purely civil 
ones that are all that a private person or institution can impose. 
Criminal penalties for embezzlement are an example. This 
consideration may warrant imposing criminal penalties on athletes 
who engage in forms of doping that both are difficult to detect and 
reduce the economic value of the sport. 
A further problem with antidoping measures is that to the extent 
that they are only partially effective, they may actually result in more 
doping. Suppose some athletes are deterred by the measures and 
cease doping. This increases the expected benefit of doping to a 
competing athlete who is not deterred by the measures, perhaps 
because he is one of the weaker players whom I have mentioned.50 
The fact that many crimes are committed even though the 
punishments for crime in this country are severe suggests that it is not 
optimal to adopt a punishment schedule that is so draconian as to 
 
 50. See supra p. 1736. 
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deter all misconduct, so partial deterrence of doping could be 
ineffectual. 
When punishments (S in my simple economic model) are capped 
at a fairly low level, effective deterrence depends on setting P (the 
probability that the sanction will be imposed) at a high level. This 
may be difficult to achieve in the sports-doping arena, where 
detection depends on the outcome of an unpredictable arms race 
between concealers and enforcers. Probably, therefore, sports doping 
will continue, with the equilibrium amount determined by (private) 
benefits and enforcement costs. 
The economic approach (hardly a solution) to the problem of 
sports doping that I have proposed51 would not take care of Sandel’s 
concerns with doping. It is apparent from the other chapters in his 
book—indeed from the book’s title (The Case Against Perfection)—
that he thinks that more is at stake than simply assuring an 
economically efficient sports market. For him sports doping, like 
human cloning, which he discusses in another chapter of his book,52 
presents a momentous moral issue of “Prometheanism,” of hubris, of 
a Nietzschean will to power that he associates with modernity and 
technology and deplores.53 To my simple way of thinking, modernity, 
in its technological as in its other manifestations, is simply a source of 
issues of public policy that are related to each other only in their 
common dependence on modern technology, in much the same way 
that transvestism is dependent on gender-specific dress. When people 
lived in caves and wore animal skins, there were no transvestites. And 
if it weren’t for modern biology there would be neither sports doping 
nor cloning. But it doesn’t follow that from the standpoint of ethics or 
public policy there is any connection between the two phenomena. 
I do not myself think that there is anything to the sports doping 
issue beyond consumer preferences and the behaviors of team 
owners, leagues, and individual athletes that those preferences evoke. 
The only externality, besides the cost of a regime of public law 
enforcement to back up the private sanctions available to team 
owners and league officials, is the cost that one team imposes on 
another or one player imposes on another by violating a ban imposed 
by the team owners in their mutual self-interest. So suppose it turns 
 
 51. For more on the economics of sports doping, see generally Kjetil K. Haugen, The 
Performance-Enhancing Drug Game, 5 J. OF SPORTS ECON. 67 (2004). 
 52. See SANDEL, supra note 1, at 6–8. 
 53. See id. at 89. 
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out that the “crowd” actually prefers spectacle to sport—that people 
want to see bionic football players collide with each other, or 
genetically altered runners race at 50 miles per hour, or basketball 
players nine feet tall as a result of doping with human growth 
hormone. So what (apart from health concerns, discussed below)? 
The sports scene is very different from what it was when the ancient 
Greeks invented the Olympic Games. It is different largely because of 
technological progress, and it may continue to change with further 
progress. I do not know what bad or for that matter good effects the 
changes in sport over the millennia have wrought, except to provide 
more entertainment for the masses, which is at least a modestly good 
thing. I do not know what would be lost if people lost their interest in 
observing hierarchies of strength, speed, agility, and the like and 
preferred spectacle. Does Sandel think that sports fans are better 
people than people who don’t follow sports, because they want to 
observe the natural hierarchies in action? 
At some point, the safety and health of the players would 
become a matter of social concern. We allow football players to do 
terrible damage to each other, but we would not allow Roman-style 
gladiatorial combat to the death even if people could be hired, as 
undoubtedly they could be, to fight to the death—even if, indeed, 
such combat were efficient in an economic sense. 
But that is not Sandel’s objection to the transformation of sport 
into spectacle. His objection, spelled out in chapter 5 of his book 
(“Mastery and Gift”), is that “[i]f the genetic revolution erodes our 
appreciation for the gifted character of human powers and 
achievements, it will transform three key features of our moral 
landscape—humility, responsibility, and solidarity.”54 Thus, for 
Sandel, it is not so much that spectacle is bad as that a lively sense of 
the existence of hierarchies of innate traits, which an interest in sports 
cultivates, is morally and politically good. 
The suggestion that sports fans are more given to humility than 
those who are indifferent to sports is unconvincing. We do not 
associate humility with the spectators at the gladiatorial contests in 
the Roman Colosseum, at a bullfight, at the Super Bowl, at a 
prizefight, at the 1936 Olympics, at professional soccer games in 
Europe and South America. I particularly question Sandel’s 
 
 54. Id. at 86. Here, as throughout the book, Sandel’s emphasis is on genetic alteration; but 
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admiration for humility,55 which is one of the least attractive of the so-
called virtues. It overlaps with fatalism, passivity, and 
otherworldliness. A slavish trait, it is also inconsistent with a lively 
recognition of innate human differences; it ascribes success and 
failure to chance rather than to talent—hence the profound mismatch 
between sports and humility, a mismatch that exposes a deep 
inconsistency in Sandel’s argument. 
But I am more concerned with the quietistic implications of 
humility. Sandel describes humility as the attitude that “invites us to 
abide the unexpected, to live with dissonance, to reign [sic] in the 
impulse to control.”56 Why should we encourage such passivity? Had 
early man been guided by Sandel, the human race would quickly have 
become extinct, having forsworn Promethean aspirations to control 
fire and make tools and in these and other ways tame a murderous 
environment by reducing the domain of the unexpected. Dissonance, 
uncertainty, and inability to control one’s environment are adversities 
caused by human limitations in the face of indifferent nature. They 
are adversities to be overcome, not virtues to be cultivated. 
“As humility gives way,” he writes, “responsibility expands to 
daunting proportions. We attribute less to chance and more to 
choice.”57 That is true, but it is a good thing. Attributing to chance the 
successes and failures that befall us is a temptation to fatalism. And 
fatalism is a formula for inaction. “Paradoxically,” Sandel continues, 
“the explosion of responsibility for our own fate, and that of our 
children, may diminish our sense of solidarity with those less 
fortunate than ourselves.”58 He goes on to observe, I think correctly, 
that as more of our life prospects come under our control and less is 
due to chance, the scope for health, life, casualty, and liability 
insurance, and also for social insurance (such as public welfare), 
diminishes.59 Insurance involves the pooling of risks. In the limit, if all 
is certain, if there are no unknowns, there are no risks to pool and 
therefore no demand for insurance and we no longer feel ourselves to 
be in the same boat with others, other than those we love. “The 
meritocracy, less chastened by chance, would become harder, less 
 
 55. See id. at 27. 
 56. Id. at 86. 
 57. Id. at 87. 
 58. Id. at 89. 
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forgiving.”60 But it is an empirical question whether the existence of 
private and social insurance creates a feeling of solidarity and as a 
result makes us less “forgiving” of human failure. My own sense is 
that mutual dependence does foster a sense of solidarity but in doing 
so undermines autonomy. We seek to reduce the costs of both private 
and social insurance by imposing restrictions on the behavior of the 
high-risk members of the insurance pools. Is this sacrifice of 
individuality a good thing? Sandel does not say. If it is not a good 
thing, is there any basis for embracing it anyway? That is not a 
question that Sandel can answer. 
And there are other solidarities besides those of the insurance 
pool. There is nationalism. There is the spirit of the mob—much in 
evidence at some sports events. I find particularly unattractive, 
indeed repulsive, the combination of humility, diminished personal 
responsibility, and solidarity, on the one hand, with the admiration of 
innate, unalterable (except by technological interventions that Sandel 
wants to forbid)61 hierarchies of talent on the other hand. On the field, 
the heroes, displaying awesome innate abilities. In the stands, the 
masses, humble in their undifferentiated mediocrity. The vision is one 
of medieval stasis; it is pessimistic, Heideggerian, and fearful. 
Not that fear of change, fear of modernity, is an unreasonable 
response to our world. Modernity is full of dangers, including dangers 
created or exacerbated by technological progress and associated 
changes, such as population increase. These dangers include 
apocalyptic terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, global warming, biodiversity depletion, pandemics, and 
catastrophic scientific accidents.62 But reduction of these dangers will 
depend on technological and analytical methods repugnant to Sandel, 
and on a spirit, opposed to his, of active engagement with a 
threatening environment. 
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